Review of Cohen, D., "Three Lectures on Post-Industrial Society" by Standing, Guy
Cohen, D.: Three Lectures on Post-Industrial Society 
 
Book review by Guy Standing 
 
This version was accepted for publication in the Journal of Economics, Vol.98, No.3, 2009, pp.261-266. The 
published article is available at 
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/kapjeczfn/v_3a98_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a261-266.htm 
 
This is an elegant little book, of less than 100 pages, that is in the French tradition of an essay. 
Just as with Montaigne’s essays, one may read it for flashes of insight and anecdotal imagery, 
rather than as a scientific treatise or prescription for a political strategy. It largely avoids critical 
engagement. This and the essay form are its strength and its weakness. It may satisfy those with 
a general knowledge of public affairs. It is surely frustrating for any reader familiar with the 
relevant research and literature. Scholars should also be warned that what might sound nice as a 
lecture rarely turns nicely into a book. Compressing a lot into a little is a fine art. Few can do it 
well, and all should think long and hard before trying. 
 
Problems start with the concept of ‘post-industrial society’, since it suggests the person cannot 
characterise today, other than by saying it comes after something. To make it more confusing, 
Cohen claims there was one industrial society model whereas there are several post-industrial 
societies (p. 9, for example). There is no consistent periodisation. On page 2 we are told “the 
industrial society of the 20th century linked a mode of production to a mode of protection”. Note 
the singular in each case. Later, in chapter 3, he uncritically endorses Gosta Esping-Andersen’s 
view that in the 20
th
 century there were three models of social protection, or welfare state. 
 
Some commentators, including this reviewer, see globalisation as generating pressures towards 
convergence of national structures and policies. Cohen seems to be a ‘divergenist’ (to coin a 
term). Thus he claims that, with globalisation (which he calls the second globalisation, creating 
problems that we address later), “various social models seem to be drifting apart” (p. 9). There is 
little in the book to show that this is the case. 
 
This is a problem with a grand essay (albeit in the form of ‘three lectures’), for in trying to cover 
a vast terrain inevitably the essayist must make sweeping generalizations that leave him open to 
attack, and which cannot be substantiated in the essay format. But what a reader can be justified 
in wanting is a clear, convincing narrative. Here Daniel Cohen may come to feel that he has 
failed to provide it, even though one senses he could have done so had he been pressed to do so. 
 
Chapter 1 begins by making a fleeting reference to Karl Polanyi’s ‘Great Transformation’, which 
Cohen says “occurred in the 19th century” (p. 11). The text does not elaborate. This is surely to 
misrepresent Polanyi. The gist of his analysis was that in the 19th century financial capital 
became dominant in pushing for a market society in a period when the economy was 
‘disembedded’ from society, implying that there were no appropriate mechanisms of regulation, 
redistribution and social protection that would have checked the relentless growth of economic 
insecurity and inequality.
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 Eventually, crises occurred in the early 20th century, leading to political populism and 
extremism and a set of horrors, after which the state moved to re-embed the economy in society, 
ushering in variants of the welfare state. In other words, the Great Transformation did not occur 
in the 19th century. The claim that it did is reiterated at the end of the book, where he says “the 
economy freed itself from the tutorship of the state and claimed autonomy” (p. 91). A more 
correct way of putting it would have been that the interests of financial capital captured the state, 
inducing governments to make reforms in their interest. The autonomy that finance sought was 
really power, so that the policies and institutions built up intensified their wealth and control. 
The word autonomy gives an impression that the financiers were outside the state and not 
dependent on it for their opulence and activities. 
 
Cohen’s starting premise permeates the book. He later presents what he calls the second 
globalisation as a Transformation, rather than a phase of disembeddness that would precipitate a 
crisis. It is thus unsurprising that he does not identify a looming crisis, let alone warn of a global 
financial crisis. The timing of his book was unfortunate. But his way of depicting globalisation 
and post-industrial society provides no means of foreseeing such a crisis. 
 
He does paint a sketch of what he calls ‘five ruptures’—a new industrial revolution, a social 
rupture associated with “a new way of conceiving human labour”, a cultural revolution based on 
‘individualism’, financial market ascendancy that, according to Cohen, is unrelated to the other 
ruptures, and the entry of China and India into world capitalism, which “owes little to the other 
ruptures” (p. 12). This way of looking at trends lacks a coherence of a model of transformation. 
Without that, one is left with a series of disjointed anecdotes. 
 
Perhaps most crucially, Cohen steers clear of class and the struggles that take place between 
interests in society. But financial markets did not become ascendant by chance or as a result of 
intervention from some deus ex machina, nor did those other ruptures materialise autonomously. 
But there is no sense of agency in the essay. He could have gained by dabbling in some dirty 
water. 
 
While steering clear of class, Cohen tells us that there has been a “flattening of the hierarchical 
structure” in the organisation of work (p. 16). Here he touches on something that has 
preoccupied this reviewer in a trilogy of books. Suffice it to say there is little evidence of 
flattening. The examples Cohen cites scarcely help his cause. He claims managers are now more 
‘productive’ because they have taken over ‘the labour of typists’. One could just as easily argue 
that managers obliged to spend a lot of time word processing are spending less time doing tasks 
by which they could provide high value added. The reality, probably, is that more managers are 
overstretched, losing control of their labour and time in general. But there is a disconnect in the 
book, for at some places we are told there used to be a cosy relationship between managers and 
workers that has broken down, while at others we are told a strong hierarchy has diminished. 
 
Again, the trouble is that painting a sketch of a vast terrain requires generalisations, which are 
overstretched. The claim (p. 18) that “skilled work became more productive, so its remuneration 
could rise” is typical. Besides the difficulty of defining ‘skilled’ in historical terms, there is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
little matter of bargaining power. Assembly workers in the car industry long earned much more 
than nurses, on average. It is not clear that the former are more ‘skilled’ than the latter. 
 
Having claimed there is a flattening of the hierarchical structure, Cohen asserts that “there is now 
a greater probability of remaining at the bottom of the wage structure for life” (p. 19). Whatever 
hierarchy means, surely a feature of a flatter structure would be the opposite of this. Moreover, 
there is overwhelming evidence that wage and earnings differentials have vastly increased, again 
scarcely consistent with a flatter structure. There is a missing element in his perspective. Wider 
earnings differentials and stagnating median wages are partly a reflection of the systematic 
political curbing of collective bargaining combined with the effects of globalisation, on which 
Cohen is trapped by his narrow view of what it constitutes, as we will see. 
 
Before coming to that, it is worth reflecting on Cohen’s section on “May 1968”. He was a little 
young at the time. I was an insignificant foot soldier. But to claim that the 1968 revolts were 
severest in Germany, Italy and Japan, because those countries were the perpetrators of the 
Second World War, is absurd (p. 27). I recall events in France, UK, USA and Greece. Remember 
Paris, London, Berkeley? 
 
Cohen sees May 1968 as “the emergence of youth as an autonomous social force”. I have long 
argued against economists who saw the preceding era as “the golden age of capitalism”, and 
agree with Cohen that 1968 did “fracture the standardised world created by their parents”, 
although think it a bit unfair to attribute that world to those who were the victims or bystanders 
of its creation. The trouble is that the image is limited, merely stating the obvious, that the revolts 
were mostly led by youth. Most upheavals in history have been dominated by the young, 
although in 1968 there were plenty of older workers who joined strikes, and leading figures were 
ageing academics, such as Herbert Marcuse. 
 
A better image could have been drawn from a proper reading of Polanyi. The events of 1968 
marked thewaning period of social democracy, in which an embourgeoisement of what had been 
known as the working class had taken place. Polanyi’s Transformation had run its course; 
henceforth the model built up by his generation went into retreat, hesitantly at first, but after the 
collapse of Keynesianism in the mid-1970s, at full throttle in the 1980s as the political right 
gained ascendancy. Social democrats of various kinds tried to hold political office, but 
increasingly either failed or did so only by making messy compromises with economic 
liberalism. 
 
There is nothing on this in Cohen’s essays. I do not see how one can tell a coherent story of 
‘post-industrial society’ unless one deals with the political economy of the time. It is a shame, for 
the story reached its nadir in the financial market crisis of 2008–2009, in which social democracy 
was swept away across Europe, culminating in virtual disappearance in Italy, defeat in Germany 
in September 2009 and an impending meltdown in the UK in 2010. The fact is that social 
democrats had presided uncritically over growing economic insecurity and inequality, allowing a 
more hierarchical society to confront the new youth, who were tripping unsteadily into the 
emerging precariat. 
 
Cohen’s second essay hinges on a claim that the era before the Great War was “the first 
globalisation”. The parallels drawn between then and the post-1980 “second globalisation” are 
unconvincing. He begins by claiming that Russia, India and China all ‘participated’ in the first 
globalisation, implying that this was no different from nowadays. This is fanciful, since one 
country was still quasi-feudal, one a fragmented colony of the British Empire and one subject to 
warlords and mercantile foreign domination and exploitation. Trade essentially involved the rich 
industrialised countries exporting manufactured goods, while they imported raw materials and 
primary goods from the underdeveloped countries. This is dramatically different from the 
globalization era. In the 19th century, trade took place largely in complementary goods and 
services, not competitive ones. 
 
A problem with equating the pre-1914 and post-1980 eras is that it turns attention away from the 
uniqueness of the latter period. When Keynes sat in his study and marvelled at how he could 
obtain tea from Ceylon and spices from the Orient, he was looking at a world that in his view 
was producing complementary goods. Today, globalisation is about an open market system in 
which competitive pressures are dominant. If workers demand something in one country, 
employers and financial capital can merely switch production and investment to a lower-income 
place where workers are cowed. 
 
The failure to see the uniqueness of globalisation is revealed in various ways. Cohen says the 
“present globalisation lags behind its predecessor in at least two essential dimensions: financial 
globalisation and international migration” (p. 38) Saying that Britain exported more of its 
savings before 1913 than it does now does not imply that the two periods are similar. Today, 
savings and capital flow in all directions. It is the large developing countries that have been 
exporting their savings to prop up living standards and allow huge deficits in the USA and 
several other rich countries. As for the comment on migration, whereas at the outset of the 20
th
 
century most consisted of Europeans moving to settle in the New World, forging an industrial 
working class in the USA, much of today’s migration is from low income countries to provide 
cheap labour in rich countries and in certain regions of developing countries. The mobility is 
between all parts of the world, much of it circulatory, much of it illegal or undocumented. It also 
results in a huge informal flow of ‘capital’, in the form of remittances, much of that being 
undocumented as well. 
 
From his view of the ‘first globalisation’, Cohen concludes that all countries that would become 
the Third World learned that “world trade is not a source of enrichment for poor nations” (p. 40). 
On the contrary, many realised they could only benefit by becoming exporters of manufactured 
goods. This led to the rise of Japan and the NICs, which leveraged the international redivision of 
labour that has epitomised the one-and-only globalisation era. China and India were to be the 
primary beneficiaries as they rushed to embrace export-led economic growth. 
 
Again, Cohen’s two-globalisation pose lets him down. There is a peculiar section postulating a 
‘centre-periphery’ system, in which “the centre is rich…. because it fosters specialisation on the 
part of its members” (p. 46). Then he claims, “In the new international division of labour, the 
rich tend to sell immaterial goods and buy material goods.” This is too dualistic. It may sound 
good in a lecture, but it does not travel well into a book. Many of today’s poorest produce or live 
off immaterial goods (services). 
They belong to the swelling global precariat, many doing menial insecure jobs in the global 
economy. The really rich mostly live off capital and rent, many not selling anything at all. Some 
are executives, managers, shareholders and members of the salariat attached to global MNEs, 
which may well sell material goods even if those doing the labour are scattered across the globe. 
 
This prompts a crucial point that Cohen does not mention. Globalisation has created a 
globalising open labour market, in which the entry of ‘Chindia’ has meant, roughly, a 
quadrupling of the labour supply to the open market system, which has profoundly weakened the 
bargaining position of almost all those who live predominantly by supplying labour. Anything 
that takes a physical form can be produced almost anywhere, and the wages of Chinese workers 
are still less than a tenth of those of German or American workers, while their productivity is 
certainly much more than a tenth of theirs. 
 
Cohen’s second lecture concludes with a few demographics that he sees as linked to 
globalisation. There is one interesting statement (p. 55): “Today the world holds 6 billion human 
inhabitants: 1 billion rich ones, 1 billion who aspire to become rich, and 3 billion poor ones.” 
One wonders what happened to the disappearing billion. But on what grounds can Daniel Cohen 
or any of us say there are a billion “rich” and a billion who aspire to be so? Do none of the 3 or 4 
billion others not aspire to be rich? 
 
Finally, chapter 3 deals with the European social model, a term that raises the hairs on the arms 
of this reviewer. Cohen claims (p. 60) that in the past 20 years there has been “increasing 
differentiation between social models in the EU”. No evidence is given. He begins by referring 
to old differentials, first reiterating Philippe d’Iribarne’s three modes of liberty, which he claims 
are British (Lockean), German (Kantian) and French. He then cites, wholly approvingly, Esping-
Andersen’s 1990 model of three welfare state regimes (liberal, corporatist and social 
democratic). In other words, he believes Europe was differentiated. What is unclear is how those 
models—if one accepts them—have become more differentiated. This reviewer believes there 
has been a convergence, and that none of the terms used by Esping-Andersen captures the sense 
in which social and labour market policy has become directive.
2
 
 
In one of the few places where Cohen uses statistics, the text diverges from the data. He says (p. 
67) that countries where unemployment was lowest in the 1960s are those where it is highest 
today. His Table shows otherwise. For instance, Denmark had one of the lowest rates in the 
1960s and in 2006, the final date given; Switzerland had the lowest rate in the 1960s and in 2006. 
He compounds his problem by pronouncing magisterially, “European unemployment no longer 
has any meaning” (p. 67), saying that a gap had opened up between the high unemployment 
countries of France, Germany and Italy and the rest. His own Table does not support this, and 
nor do other data he could have cited. 
 
Although there is surely some path dependency, and although some European countries have 
managed to disguise some of their unemployment, notably by using incapacity benefits and 
labour subsidies to prop up jobs, this reviewer believes that convergence is the dominant trend 
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across European labour markets, with country after country adhering to the dictates of labour 
market flexibility, curbing corporatist arrangements, dismantling employment security 
regulations and enforcing more directive regulation (not deregulating), while moving steadily 
towards workfare ‘active’ labour market policies combined with means-testing social assistance. 
Everywhere, it is accentuating the extent of economic insecurity and anxiety. It is a phase that is 
unsustainable, as Polanyi would have understood. 
 
Daniel Cohen is a distinguished French economist who deserves to be taken seriously. This 
review has tried to give his book the respect his status merits. He has raised many provocative 
issues. Perhaps they are just too complex to make an essay. 
